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Abstract
Prior work on generating explanations has been fo-
cused on providing the rationale behind the robot’s
decision making. While these approaches provide
the right explanations from the explainer’s perspec-
tive, they fail to heed the cognitive requirement of
understanding an explanation from the explainee’s
perspective. In this work, we set out to address
this issue from a planning context by considering
the order of information provided in an explana-
tion, which is referred to as the progressiveness of
explanations. Progressive explanations contribute
to a better understanding by minimizing the cu-
mulative cognitive effort required for understand-
ing all the information in an explanation. As a
result, such explanations are easier to understand.
Given the sequential nature of communicating in-
formation, a general formulation based on goal-
based Markov Decision Processes for generating
progressive explanation is presented. The reward
function of this MDP is learned via inverse rein-
forcement learning based on explanations that are
provided by human subjects. Our method is evalu-
ated in an escape-room domain. The results show
that our progressive explanation generation method
reduces the cognitive load over two baselines.
1 Introduction
As robotic applications start to benefit a diverse set of do-
mains, human-robot interaction has evolved to be an increas-
ingly important subject. In human-robot teaming, it is desired
that the interaction occurs in a coherent manner that is ob-
served in human-human teaming [Chakraborti et al., 2017a;
Cooke, 2015]. Similar to a human teammate, a robotic agent
is required to not only understand its human peers, but also
explain its own decision or behaviors when necessary.
Explanations in a teaming context provide the rationale
behind an individual agent’s decision making [Lombrozo,
2006], and help with building a shared situation awareness
and maintaining trust between teammates [Endsley, 1988;
Cooke, 2015]. Although there exists prior work on generating
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explanations, the focus has been on generating the right ex-
planations from the explainer’s perspective rather than good
explanations for the explainee [Go¨belbecker et al., 2010;
Hanheide et al., 2017; Sohrabi et al., 2011].
Unsurprisingly, the right explanation may not necessar-
ily be a good explanation–anyone with parental experience
would share the sympathy. Such dissonance between the ex-
plainer and explainee may be a result of various inconsis-
tencies, such as information asymmetry or different cogni-
tive capabilities, just to name a few. These inconsistencies
may be summarized as model differences–the differences be-
tween the cognitive models that govern the generation and in-
terpretation of an explanation, respectively, for the explainer
and explainee [Chakraborti et al., 2019]. When these two
models are the same, as is assumed in most prior work, an
explanation from the perspective of the explainer would be
not only right but also perfectly understandable to the ex-
plainee, that is, as if the explanation were made to the ex-
plainer himself. The more general case when the models
differ has also been investigated [Chakraborti et al., 2017b;
Zakershahrak et al., 2019] under the model reconciliation
setting, where the focus is on explaining domain model dif-
ferences such that the two models become more compatible.
One remaining challenge in explanation generation, however,
is to account for the differences in the cognitive capabilities
to understand an explanation.
In this work, we take a step further by generating expla-
nations while considering the differences between the cogni-
tive capabilities that may be present between the explainer
and explainee. This is especially relevant to human-robot
teaming since robots are frequently deployed to situations
that require high cognitive and computational abilities that
humans do not have. To accommodate this, the motivation
here is to generate explanations that reduce the cognitive ef-
fort required for understanding them. In particular, in this
work, we focus on the influence of the order of informa-
tion on the cognitive effort of the explainee in planning tasks.
First, we note that making an explanation is normally not an
instantaneous effort; instead, information must be conveyed
in a sequential order; furthermore, given the characteriza-
tions of our cognitive systems [Ericsson and Smith, 1991;
Kahneman, 2011], we often could not (or would not) wait
until all the information has been conveyed before process-
ing it. As a result, the order of presenting information mat-
ters. Hence, one of the keys to reducing cognitive effort is to
minimize the cumulative effort required for processing all the
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information progressively in an explanation. Consequently,
we term our approach progressive explanation generation, to
capture that aspect. Consider the following example of a con-
versation between two friends, which illustrates the impor-
tance of providing information in the right order when mak-
ing an explanation:
Amy: Let’s go to the outlet today.
Monica: My car is ready.
Amy: Great!
Monica: The rain will stop soon.
Amy: Wonderful!
Monica: By the way, today is a holiday
(shops closed).
Amy: You are telling me now!
Monica: Let us go to the central park!
Amy: ...
Such cognitive dissonance illustrated above occurs frequently
in our lives and it is our aim in this work to address it in
order to improve human-robot interaction. To this end, a
general formulation based on goal-based Markov Decision
Processes for generating progressive explanation is presented
given the sequential nature of communicating information
in an explanation. We propose to learn a quantification of
the cognitive effort of each step as the reward function in
an inverse reinforcement framework [Ng and Russell, 2000;
Abbeel and Ng, 2004; Ziebart et al., 2008], as an explana-
tion is being made. Both domain-dependent and domain-
independent features are used in learning based on expla-
nations provided by human subjects. It is part of our goal
to identify which features play an important role in the pro-
gressiveness of an explanation. We evaluate our approach in
an escape-room domain. The results show that the domain-
independent features play a comparative (if not more impor-
tant) role than domain dependent features. This observation
has two important implications for explanations in planning
tasks: 1) given that the domain independent feature is closely
related to the cost of replanning, it verifies our hypothesis that
humans replan during an explanation (not just after every-
thing is explained) in complex tasks; 2) domain independent
features may be used for generating progressive explanations
for domains that have similar characterizations to ours–this
allows our method to not only generalize to different sce-
narios but also different domains. Comparison with baseline
methods show that our method reduces the cognitive load.
2 Related Work
Explainable AI [Gunning, 2017] is increasingly considered
to be an important paradigm for designing future intelligent
agents, especially as such systems begin to constitute an im-
portant part of our lives. The key requirement of explainable
agency [Langley et al., 2017] is to be “explainable” to the
human partners. To be explainable, an agent must not only
provide a solution to achieve a goal, but also make sure that
the solution is perceived as such by its human peers. A de-
terminant here is the human’s interpretation of the agent’s
behavior. It is critical to take careful steps to avoid sit-
uations where the agent’s assistance would be interpreted
as no more than an interruption, which resulted in the pit-
fall of earlier effort in designing intelligent assistants, such
as the loss of situation awareness and trust [Endsley, 2016;
Langfred, 2004].
The key challenge to explainable agency hence is the abil-
ity to model the human cognitive model that is responsible
for interpreting the behaviors of other agents [Chakraborti
et al., 2017a]. With such a model, there are different ways
to make the robot’s behavior explainable. One way is to
bias the robot’s behavior towards the human’s expectation
of it based on the human’s cognitive model. Under this
framework, a robot can generate legible motions [Dragan
and Srinivasa, 2013] or explicable plans [Zhang et al., 2017;
Zakershahrak et al., 2018]. Essentially, the robot sacrifices
the plan quality to respect the human’s expectation–the result-
ing plan is often a more costly plan. Another way is to pro-
vide a forewarning of the robot’s intention before execution,
such as for persuasion [Petty and Cacioppo, 1979]. In [Gong
and Zhang, 2018], the approach there is to provide additional
context to help explain the robot’s decision. The third way,
which is the most relevant to ours, is for the robot to ex-
plain its decision via explanations [Go¨belbecker et al., 2010;
Hanheide et al., 2017; Sohrabi et al., 2011]. The benefit of
generating explanations, compared to generating explainable
plans, is that the robot can keep its original (and optimal)
plan. However, as mentioned earlier, the focus there is of-
ten on providing the rationale behind the explainer’s decision
making, while largely ignoring the explainee. In [Chakraborti
et al., 2017b], this gap is addressed by considering expla-
nation generation as a model reconciliation problem, which
takes into account the explainee’s model. Although the cog-
nitive requirement is implicitly considered, the aim there is to
reconcile (i.e., reduce) the differences in domain models, so
that the robot’s plan would be interpretable also in the model
of the explainee.
The idea of progressive explanation generation is based on
the hypothesis that reducing replanning effort also reduces
the cognitive load, which is anticipated but never empirically
verified [Fox et al., 2006]. Generating progressive explana-
tions also bears some similarities to the idea of nudging the
human towards a new path [Lien et al., 2004] or providing
constant and non-intrusive reminders for performing various
tasks [Maxwell et al., 1999]. The general idea is to facilitate
“smooth” or socially acceptable [Miller, 2018] interactions,
whether physical or cognitive.
3 Model Reconciliation
We base our work on a general model reconciliation set-
ting for explanation generation that considers both the mod-
els of the explainer and explainee, which is introduced
in [Chakraborti et al., 2017b]. As shown in Fig. 1, the human
uses MH to generate her expectation of the robot’s behav-
ior, while the robot’s actual behavior is being created using
the robot’s model MR, which is different from MH . There-
fore, piMR , which is the plan created from MR, could also
be different with piMH , which is the plan created from MH .
Whenever these two plans differ, the robot’s plan must be ex-
plained.
Definition 1 (Model Reconciliation). Model reconciliation
[Chakraborti et al., 2017b] is a tuple (pi∗I,G, 〈MR,MH〉),
Figure 1: Explanation generation as model reconciliation
[Chakraborti et al., 2017b]. MR denotes the robot model and MH
denotes the human model that is used to generate her expectation of
the robot’s behavior (piMH ). When the expectation does not match
the robot’s behavior, piMR , explanations must be generated.
where cost(pi∗I,G,M
R) = cost∗MR(I,G).
where pi∗I,G is the robot’s optimal plan to be explained.
cost(pi∗I,G,M
R) is the cost of the robot’s plan under the
model MR. cost∗MR(I,G) returns the optimal plan given
the initial state and goal state pair using MR. Therefore, the
constraint in the Definition 1 ensures that the robot’s plan is
optimal in its own model.
In this setting, the robot must generate an explanation to
modify the human’s model MH such that pi∗I,G becomes ex-
plainable in the human’s modified model (denoted as M̂H )
after the reconciliation. As a result, an explanation for a
model reconciliation setting can be considered as requesting
changes to the model of the human. Note that making an ex-
planation may also lead to an error report if it is identified that
the robot’s model was incorrect.
To capture the model changes, a model function Γ :M→
2F is defined to convert a model to a set of model features
[Chakraborti et al., 2017b], where M is the model space
and F the feature space. In this way, one model can be
updated to another model with editing functions that change
one feature at a time. The set of feature changes is denoted
as ∆(M1,M2) and the distance between two models as the
number of such feature changes is denoted as δ(M1,M2). In
this work, we assume that the model is defined in PDDL [Fox
and Long, 2003], an extension of STRIPS [Fikes and Nilsson,
1971], where a model is specified as a tuple M = (D, I,G).
The domain D = (F,A) is comprised of a set of predicates,
F , and a set of actions, A. F is used to specify the state
of the world. Each action a ∈ A changes the state of the
world by adding or deleting predicates. Therefore, an action
can be represented as a = (pre(a), eff+(a), eff−(a), ca);
where pre(a) denotes the preconditions of the action a, and
eff+(a), eff−(a) indicate add and delete effects, respec-
tively, and ca is the cost of the action. For example, a very
simple model for Amy in our motivating example would be:
Initial state: not-holiday
Goal state: happy
Actions:
OUTLET-SHOPPING
pre: not-holiday (car-ready is-sunny)
eff+: happy
VISIT-PARK
pre: (car-ready is-sunny)
eff+: happy
For simplicity, we use only boolean variables above. The
variables in parenthesis are optional predicates that are pre-
ferred but not required. The goal is to achieve the effect of
happy. In this example, the model, denoted as MAmy, will
be converted by the model function Γ to:
Γ(M Amy) = {
init-has-not-holiday,
goal-has-happy,
OS-has-precondition-not-holiday,
OS-has-add-effect-happy, ...}
where OS above is short for OUTLET-SHOPPING. The
function essentially turns a model into a set of features that
fully specifies the model. Hence, changing the set of features
will also change the model.
Definition 2 (Explanation Generation as Model Reconcilia-
tion). The explanation generation [Chakraborti et al., 2017b]
problem is a tuple (pi∗I,G, 〈MR, MH〉) where an explanation
is a subset of ∆(MR,MH) such that:
1) Γ(M̂H) \ Γ(MH) ⊆ Γ(MR), and
2) cost(pi∗I,G, M̂H) − cost∗M̂H (I,G) < cost(pi
∗
I,G,M
H) −
cost∗MH (I,G).
where M̂H denotes the model after the changes. The first
condition requires the changes to the human’s model to be
consistent with the robot’s model. The second condition
states that the robot’s plan must be closer (in terms of cost)
to the optimal plan after the model changes than the situation
before–an explanation should have the effect of moving the
expected plan closer to the robot’s optimal plan.
Definition 3 (Complete Explanation). A complete explana-
tion [Chakraborti et al., 2017b] is an explanation that addi-
tionally satisfies cost(pi∗I,G, M̂H) = cost
∗
M̂H
(I,G).
A complete explanation requires the model changes to
make the robot’s plan also optimal in the changed human
model, so that the robot’s plan becomes interpretable in the
human’s model as well. A minimally complete explanation
(MCE) is also defined in [Chakraborti et al., 2017b], which
is a complete explanation with the minimum number of unit
feature changes. An example of M̂Amy (corresponds to M̂H )
after a minimally complete explanation is:
Initial state:
not-holida car-ready (+) is-sunny (+)
Goal state: happy
Actions:
OUTLET-SHOPPING
pre: not-holiday (car-ready is-sunny)
eff+: happy
VISIT-PARK
pre: (car-ready is-sunny)
eff+: happy
where the strikeout denotes the feature removed and +’s de-
note additions. These changes correspond to the explana-
tion made in our motivating example. In this case, the robot
model, MR, corresponds to MMonica, is the same as M̂Amy
after the explanation (with the model changes incorporated).
4 Progressive Explanation Generation
We first present the hypotheses that we intend to verify in this
work:
• H1: Cognitive load is correlated with replanning cost.
• H2: Progressive explanations reduces cognitive load.
In progressive explanation generation, our focus is on how
the ordering of presenting information in an explanation may
affect its understanding. An explanation in our setting is nat-
urally specified as a sequence of feature changes. Since we
process information as it is received, the cumulative cognitive
effort can then be considered as the sum of effort associated
with understanding each feature change in a sequential order.
We couple the cognitive effort for each change with a model
distance metric, denoted as ρ(Mi,Mi+1) for the ith feature
change, where Mi is the model before the i-th feature change
and Mi+1 is the model after that change. Thereby, progres-
sive explanation generation can be defined as the following
optimization problem:
Definition 4 (Progressive Explanation Generation (PEG)).
A progressive explanation is a complete explanation
with an ordered sequence of unit feature changes
that minimize the sum of the model distance metric:
arg min
∆(M̂H ,MH)
∑
fi∈〈∆(M̂H ,MH)〉 ρi, where ρi is short
for ρ(Mi,Mi+1), i is the index of unit feature changes, and
fi denotes the i-th unit feature change.
The angle brackets above convert a set to an ordered set
and the summation is over every unit feature change in an
explanation, which is computed for before and after each unit
feature change is made in a progressive fashion. The goal
of PEG is to minimize the cumulative model distance metric,
and thereby minimize the cognitive effort required from the
explainee to understand the explanation.
4.1 Learning the Model Distance Metric
To learn the model distance metric for PEG, we formulate
the problem as an inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) [Ng
and Russell, 2000; Abbeel and Ng, 2004; Ziebart et al., 2008]
framework, where we assume the task of generating explana-
tions can be expressed as a goal-based Markov Decision Pro-
cesses (MDP). A goal-based MDP is defined by a 6-element
tuple (S,A, T,R, γ,G), where S is the state space and A is
the action space. The domain dynamics is represented as the
transition function T that determines the probability of tran-
sitioning into state s′ when taking an action a in state s (i.e.,
P (s′|s, a)). R is the reward function and the goal of the agent
is to maximize the expected cumulative reward. γ is the dis-
count factor that encodes the agent’s preference of current re-
wards over future rewards. G is a set of goal states where for
each g ∈ G, T (g, a, g) = 1,∀a ∈ A. We chose goal-based
MDP since in each scenario, although the start state could be
the same, the goal could be different and therefore the policy
would be different.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the MDP that underlies PEG. In our
work, the state space S is the set of all possible human mod-
els and the action space A is the set of all possible unit fea-
ture changes. The transition function T captures the proba-
bility that the human model would be updated to M ′ when
Figure 2: Illustration of the MDP that underlies PEG. At each time
step, the human’s modelMi serves as the state. When the robot pro-
vides a unit feature change fi (as part of the explanation) to the hu-
man, the model changes according to fi to be the next state, Mi+1.
The model distance metric ρi, which is short for ρ(Mi,Mi+1), cap-
tures the cognitive effort required to understand fi.
the human model is M and the robot explains f to her (i.e.,
P (M ′|M,f)). The model distance metric ρ serves as the re-
ward function, which depends on both the current and up-
dated human models.
4.2 Applying IRL
Following prior work on IRL [Ng and Russell, 2000; Abbeel
and Ng, 2004; Ziebart et al., 2008], we define the distance
metric as a linear combination of a set of weighted features:
ρ(M,M ′) =
∑
i
θi · ψi(M,M ′) = ΘTΨ(M,M ′)
where Ψ = {ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψk} is the set of features with re-
spect to state pair (M,M ′). Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θk} is the set
of weights corresponding to the features.
Given a set of traces in a domain as a set of explana-
tions (each is a sequence of unit features changes), which
are obtained from human subjects, our goal is to learn the
model distance metric ρ, which in turn requires us to learn
the weights Θ given a set of features. Since noise is expected
in the traces, we learn the weights by maximizing the likeli-
hood of the traces using MaxEnt-IRL [Ziebart et al., 2008] as
follows:
Θ∗ = arg max
Θ
L(D) = arg max
Θ
1
|D| logP (D|Θ)
= arg max
Θ
1
|D|
∑
G∈G
∑
ζ̂G∈DG
logP (ζ̂G|Θ)
(1)
where D is the training data set, G the collection of goal sets
G for different scenarios. ζ̂G = (M0, f1,M1, . . . , fn,Mn) is
an explanation for achieving G with ordered feature changes
provided by human subjects in a subset DG. It consists of the
initial human model (i.e., M0 = MH ), unit feature change
and the updated model at each time step. To mitigate the am-
biguity that the distribution of the traces may introduce pref-
erence for some traces over others, the principle of maximum
entropy [Ziebart et al., 2008] is employed to define the distri-
bution over all the possible traces for a specific goal (i.e., G):
P (ζG|Θ) = e
ρ(ζG)∑
ζG
eρ(ζG)
(2)
where
ρ(ζG) = Θ
TΨ(ζG) =
∑
(M,M ′)∈ζG
ΘTΨ(M,M ′)
Take Equation 2 into Equation 1, the optimization becomes:
Θ∗ = arg max
Θ
1
|D|
∑
G∈G
∑
ζ̂G∈DG
(
ΘTΨ(ζ̂G)−log
∑
ζG
eΘ
TΨ(ζG)
)
(3)
Note that ζ̂G ∈ DG in the first term above represents a trace
in the training data set while ζG in the second term above
refers to any possible trace of the domain. Since Equation
3 is convex, we use a gradient-based method to learn Θ and
divide the traces into pairs of human models as in [Ziebart et
al., 2008]:
∇ΘL = 1|D|
∑
G∈G
(∑
(M,M′)∈DG
Ψ(M,M ′)−
∑
(M,M′)∈DG
P (M,M ′|θ)Ψ(M,M ′)
)
Different from traditional applications of MaxEnt-
IRL [Ziebart et al., 2008], the model distance metric in
our work depends on both the current and next human
model. As a result, P (M,M ′|Θ) above represents the model
pair occurrence frequency (MPOF) for a pair (M,M ′),
which can be computed using dynamic programming. If we
denote the probability of occurrence of (M,M ′) at time t as
µt(M,M
′), we then have P (M,M ′|Θ) = ∑t µt(M,M ′).
The updating rules for µt is as follows:
µ1(M,M
′) = P
(
(M1,M2) = (M,M
′)
)
µt+1(M,M
′) =
∑
f
∑
M ′′
µt(M
′′,M)P (f |M)P (M ′|M,f)
The values for µ1 are initialized to the probability of the state
pair (M,M ′) being the first pair of a trace. The probability
of the occurrence of (M,M ′) at a certain time step then is
calculated based on the occurrence frequency of the previous
state pair, which has M as the second entry in the pair, any
unit feature change f that the robot would explain to the hu-
man while in state M (i.e., according to a stochastic policy),
and the probability that the human model would end up inM ′
when explaining f in state M (i.e., the transition function).
The stochastic policy P (f |M) specifies the probability of
explaining f when the human model is M , which is com-
puted as P (f |M) = P (M,f)P (M) . Similarly, they can be calcu-
lated using dynamic programming as in [Ziebart et al., 2008].
µ1(M,M
′) can then be approximated using sampled traces
generated by the stochastic policy and transition function in
each iteration. After learning the parameters for the model
distance metric, we utilize uniform cost search for a specific
goal to retrieve the best sequence of fi from a common initial
state by maximizing the reward of each state:
ζ∗G = arg max
ζG
∑
(M,M ′)∈ζG
ΘTΨ(M,M ′) (4)
4.3 Features Selection
The features used in our learning algorithm for the model dis-
tance metric belong in general to two categories: domain de-
pendent and domain independent features.
The domain dependent features in our study are chosen to
be the ones that we consider to have an impact on the cogni-
tive load. These features should be fully specifiable byM and
M ′ only given our IRL formulation. Although this imposes a
restriction on the set features we can select, it still allows for
a rich set of possibilities for any given domain. In our future
work, we will further investigate the impact of this restriction
on the learned model distance metric.
Domain independent features are chosen to reflect replan-
ning cost. We consider two types of domain independent fea-
tures: (1) action distance [Fox et al., 2006], and (2) cost dis-
tance. Each of them represents a type of plan distances. The
motivation to use plan distances is that, as the information
is communicated progressively for an explanation (as unit
model changes), humans process it as it is received (i.e., re-
plan based on the current information). Intuitively, the effort
involved in the replanning process is correlated to how many
changes must be made to a plan, which is often captured by a
distance metric. For any model Mi, we denote the plan as pii.
The following distance metrics are considered:
Action Distance: The action distance feature represents
the distance between two plans pii and pij obtained from Mi
and Mj respectively, as distance(pii, pij) = 1 − |pii ∩ pij ||pii ∪ pij | .
The action distance value is lower when two plans have more
actions in common.
Cost Distance: Similarly, the cost distance is the differ-
ence between the cost of plans pii and pij obtained from
Mi and Mj respectively: C(pii, pij) = |cost∗Mi(I,G) −
cost∗Mj (I,G)|. Due to the associative property of the cost,
we have used the square of the cost as a feature.
5 Evaluation
Figure 3: Illustration of the escape-room domain.
5.1 The Escape-Room Domain
To evaluate our approach, we conducted a human subject
study using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) with differ-
ent scenarios in an escape-room domain. This domain is de-
signed to expose the subjects to complex situations that re-
quire substantial cognitive effort in a short amount of time.
The task is situated in a damaged nuclear plant represented as
a maze-like environment in Fig. 3. Your goal is to navigate
from the starting location S to the goal location G without
going through dangerous zones as fast as you can with the
help of an external agent. The set of actions in this domain
are going to each of gateway cells from S, and get to the cell
G from there. For instance, go to cell E, go to G from E,
assuming cell E is not a dangerous passage. Although you
know all non-wall locations are initially traversable but a few
marked locations (see Fig. 3) may be affected by the disaster,
the accurate information is only communicated to you by the
external agent. Due to the limited communication bandwidth,
the external agent can only convey one piece of information
at a time (e.g.,D is a danger zone). The states of the 7 marked
locations correspond to 7 contingencies (modeled as unit fea-
ture changes in the domain) that may have affected your plan.
This means that the original MDP has 27 states. In train-
ing, the subjects performed the role of the external agent who
communicates the information to you. In testing, after the ex-
planation (similarly with one piece of information at a time)
from the external agent (this time automatically generated by
our algorithm running on a robot), you were asked to pro-
vide the best path which passes from S to G while avoiding
the danger zones. The experimental framework is elaborated
more in Sec. 5.2.
5.2 Experimental Design
We designed 8 different scenarios for the escape-room do-
main. We used 5 scenarios for training and 3 for testing. Each
scenario involves a different set of contingencies and we en-
sure that there are contingencies in the testing scenarios that
did not appear in the training scenarios. During training, the
human subjects are at first introduced to the domain and in-
formed that they are supposed to act as the external agent to
communicate the contingencies to the internal person in the
scenario. They are explained that the internal person is des-
perate to escape soon to give them a sense of urgency as well
as an incentive to elucidate the situation. We asked them at
the beginning about what path the internal person would take
assuming no danger zones are present. We use the answer to
this question later to make sure that they understand the task
so as to sift the data. Then, they are explained that they are
to guide the internal agent out by communicating one piece
of information at a time, due to the limited communication
bandwidth. The ordered sequences of contingencies that the
subjects provided in each scenario are used as “expert” traces
to learn the model distance metric.
In the testing phase, we test the subject performance with
our progressive explanation generation method and two base-
lines. In particular, we provided the subjects the contingen-
cies that are ordered 1) by our method, (2) by a random order,
and (3) by the Manhattan distance relative to the starting lo-
cation S. This time, a new set of subjects are recruited who
are told that they are the internal agent and must get out of the
nuclear plant as soon as they can. To create a highly cognitive
demanding situation, the subjects are pushed to complete the
task within 4 minutes. Responses that failed the sanity check
question or ran over 4 minutes are not used. Again, they are
given the contingencies one at a time but this time ordered by
different methods. After the task, the subjects were provided
the NASA Task Load standard questionnaire (TLX) [NASA,
2020] to evaluate the efficiency of the different methods.
5.3 Results & Analysis
To improve the quality of the responses, we set the criteria
that the worker’s HIT acceptance rate must be greater than
Figure 4: NASA TLX results for testing.
99% and has been granted MTurk Masters. In the training
phase, we created the surveys using Qualtrics and recruited
35 human subjects on MTurk, out of which 21 responses were
used. For testing, we have recruited 163 human subjects out
of which 87 responses were used. 58 of our subjects were
male and 29 were female. The average of age of our subjects
was 38.17 with a standard deviation of 11.13. For domain
dependent features, we chose 4 features related to relative po-
sition of the contingency being explained with respect to the
contingencies that have already been explained. We refer to
these features as xmin, xmax, ymax, and ymin. Table 1 shows
the normalized weights Θ for each feature after learning via
IRL as explained in Sec. 4.2.
Feature Category Feature Name Weights
Domain dependent
xmin, ymin 0.75, 0.81
xmax, ymax 0.79, 0.87
Domain independent
Cost2 Distance -0.02
Action Distance 1.00
Table 1: Normalized feature weights
As Table 1 shows, both domain dependent and domain in-
dependent features play an important role in generating the
explanations, which is expected. Interestingly, the action dis-
tance, as a domain independent feature obtained the maxi-
mum weight. This shows that the domain independent fea-
tures have a significant influence on the order of the explana-
tion being made by humans in our domain.
The results for testing are presented in Fig. 4. We can
see that our method (PEG) performs better than the baselines
for all NASA TLX metrics, a statistically significant differ-
ence was observed between PEG and other methods for a
weighted sum of TLX metrics, as shown in Table 2. Objec-
tive metrics further confirmed that our method improved task
performance as presented in Table 3 which represents the per-
centage in which the human subject came up with the correct
plan after the respective explanations. This result verifies H2.
Fig. 5 shows the action distance per explanation step for
testing scenarios. The curve of PEG is smoother, i.e. the first
four sub explanations change the plan for PEG while they
might or might not change the plan for the other approaches.
This entails that our approach sorts the important explana-
tions to be shared at the beginning of the communication. A
Figure 5: Changes of action distance per explanation step
Performance Effort Frustration
Weighted TLX
Mental Temporal (excluding
Demand Demand Performance)
Random 63.10 61.96 89.06 59.04 33.96 52.47
PEG 56.19 55.37 90.74 54.11 25.89 41.93
Manhattan 57.43 69.93 85.00 66.86 43.93 58.35
Table 2: Subjective results for each NASA TLX category
deeper analysis of the Fig. 5 shows that progressive explana-
tion creates a smoother connected to replanning cost which is
expected to contribute to a better understanding of the expla-
nation which has been conjectured in prior work [Zhang and
Zakershahrak, 2019] but never formally established. Further-
more, Table 4 demonstrates the p-value comparison between
PEG and two other baselines, which proves the statistical sig-
nificance of the results.
Random PEG Manhattan
Accuracy 85.4 (41/48) 96.3 (26/27) 66.7 (8/12)
Table 3: Objective performance in terms of task accuracy
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the problem of PEG. We took a step
further from the prior work by considering not only the right
explanation for the explainee, but also the underlying cog-
nitive effort required from the explainee for understanding
the explanation, resulting in a general framework for PEG.
An observation was that making explanation is an incremen-
tal process that constitutes of multiple steps. As a result,
the mental workload can be computed as a sum of the men-
tal workload required at each step. The goal then becomes
minimizing the sum of such effort. This converts our ex-
planation generation problem to a sequential decision mak-
ing problem. The mental workload at each step is associated
with a model distance metric, which was then learned using
inverse reinforcement learning based on both domain depen-
dent and independent features. Our approach is evaluated
with an escape-room domain with human subjects. Results
show that domain independent features play a significant role
in quantifying the cognitive load, which suggests that human
cognitive load is directly correlated with replanning cost, thus
verifying H1. We compared progressive explanation with two
PEG vs Random PEG vs Manhattan
0.037 ∗ 0.016 ∗
Table 4: p-values for the weighted sum of the NASA TLX metrics
baselines. Results show that PEG reduced cognitive load,
which verified H2.
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